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Social trust refers to trust in people in general and is related to many desired economic and 
political outcomes, such as higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and 
Knack, 2001: Berggren et al., 2008), higher education (Bjørnskov, 2009a; Papagapitos and 
Riley,  2009),  better  governance  (Knack,  2002;  Bjørnskov,  in  press),  higher  democratic 
stability  (Uslaner,  2003),  smaller  underground  economies  (D’Hernoncourt  and  Méon, 
2008) and higher rates of subjective wellbeing (Helliwell, 2006). Consequently, a central 
question is why the populations in some countries and states are more trusting than in 
others.  
This  question  has  spurned  a  strand  of  its  own  in  the  literature  on  social  trust, 
henceforth referred to merely as trust (e.g. Delhey and Newton, 2005; Brown and Uslaner, 
2005; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006). Many variables have been suggested as determinants, 
including income inequality, ethnic diversity, welfare state policies, legal quality, economic 
development, democracy, having a communist history and hierarchical religions. However, 
only few variables have turned out to be robustly associated with social trust (Bjørnskov, 
2007; Nannestad, 2008). The search for good explanations of the vast trust differences 
across  countries  and  states  continues,  as  does  the  debate  between  different  schools  of 
thought on what to look for.1 
Here, we expand the literature by providing a broad, international cross-country and 
an American cross-state analysis of the effect on trust of religiosity, by which is meant the 
fraction of a population that considers religion to be an important part of their daily life. 
Religion  has  until  recently  remained  relatively  unexplored  in  the  trust  literature  and, 
indeed,  in  economics  and  political  science  overall  (with  some  exceptions,  such  as: 
Iannaccone, 1998; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Wald et al., 2005; Wald and Wilcox, 2006). 
This relative neglect is, in our opinion, unfortunate, since there are reasons to believe that 
people’s  perceptions  and  behavior,  both  in  the  economic  and  political  realms,  are 
influenced by religiosity.  
                                                 
1 For reasons of space, we do not want to delve into the differences between different schools of thought in 
the  trust  literature.  However,  we  note  that  the  recent  literature  seems  to  be  broadly  divided  into  an 
“institutionalist” school, arguing that effective institutions of property rights and fair public bureaucracies 
create social trust, and a “culturalist” school, arguing that social trust has substantially deeper historical roots 
and cannot be easily created. See Hooghe and Stolle (2003) for a discussion. 3 
 
The results in the few studies that exist to date are mixed, depending on e.g. the kind 
of data, the sample, the measure of religiosity, the methodology and the type of religion. 
Against this background, one motivation for our study is our broad samples that stand in 
contrast to the focus of most previous studies on one particular country or a small group of 
countries. We not only cover over 100 countries with very different religious beliefs and 
traditions but use the same measure for an analysis of the US states, where one religion, 
Christianity, clearly dominates. Furthermore, the second major motivation for our study is 
that our measure of religiosity complements the ones used in most previous studies, i.e. 
religious affiliation or participation, as a share belonging to a certain religion may include a 
large number of nominal members for whom religion is not an important in their daily life 
and  as  it  is  prone  to  miss  religious  people  who  are  not  members  of  those  particular 
religions.  Likewise,  participation  may  include  people  for  whom  religion  is  not  very 
important.2  
To illustrate the last point, indicating that our measure may capture actual religiosity, 
we note that the practical importance of religion provides better measures of religiosity 
than participation. In Table 1, we cross-tabulate the answers to two questions of the US 
General  Social  Survey,  concerning  church  attendance  and  religiosity,  defined  through 
respondents’ view of the bible. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As can be seen, approximately four percent of respondents attend church regularly 
even though they define themselves as non-religious. Put differently, about 20 percent of 
those who define themselves as non-believers nonetheless take part in religious activity, 
making  such  activity  a  very  noisy  indicator  of  the  saliency  of  religion  in  society  and 
everyday life. Respondents who attend church regularly trust others to a slightly higher 
degree  than  those  who  do  not  attend,  a  difference  that  could  in  principle  reflect  that 
trusters  are  more  prone  to  take  part  in  social  activities  than  non-trusters  (cf.  Uslaner, 
                                                 
2 Inspired by Max  Weber,  McCleary and Barro (2006: 51) state the following: “Our general view  is that 
believing  relative  to  belonging  (or  attending)  is  the  main  channel  through  which  religion  matters  for 
economic and other outcomes.” This is in line with our way of motivating our measure of religiosity. A very 
similar problem is carefully outlined by Halman and Draulans (2006) under the heading “belonging without 
believing and believing without belonging”. 4 
 
2002). However, non-believers are clearly more trusting than believers. It is therefore of 
tantamount importance if one measures religiosity by, as we would argue that previous 
studies have tended to do, simple measures of organizational activity specific to religious 
organizations. Religiosity is different from religious participation or, we would argue, from 
religious affiliation. 
In this paper, we therefore look at an arguably central although somewhat overlooked 
question in this literature: Does religiosity, in the sense of being important in daily life, 
promote or discourage trust? We first list a range of arguments suggesting a theoretically 
ambiguous answer to the question. However, a set of estimates using a standard measure 
of  trust  and  the  2007  Gallup  World  Poll  measure  of  religiosity  shows  that  trust  is 
negatively  associated  with  religiosity.  Instrumental-variables  estimates  furthermore 
suggest that religiosity causes less trust. This IV approach can be considered as another 
contribution of this study to the literature, where the issue of causality has received scant 
attention thus far (Nannestad, 2008). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first present a brief presentation of the 
previous  literature  and  a  set  of  informal  theoretical  arguments  for  both  possibilities, 
building on religious doctrine and previous literature. After presenting the cross-country 
and cross-state data on trust, religiosity and a set of control variables, we go on to estimate 
the relation in a cross-country sample consisting of 105 countries. We repeat this analysis 
in a sample of 43 US states. In both cases, we apply a sensitivity analysis to see whether the 




2.  How  Does  Religiosity  Affect  Trust?  Previous  Results  and 
Theoretical Arguments 
 
In this section, we first present a brief review of the existing literature and then consider 
theoretical grounds for why religiosity might be conducive to or detrimental for trust.  
 
2.1. Previous Studies 
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Earlier empirical studies on the relationship between religion and trust can be dividied 
into three groups.  
A first group consists of cross-country studies of the determinants of trust and have 
included measures of the share of the population belonging to hierarchical religions, by 
which  is  meant  the  Catholic  church,  Islam,  and  Orthodox  churches,  or  some  other 
religions.3 The effect of hierarchical religions is generally found to be negative (La Porta et 
al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007); there are 
some signs of a positive effect of Protestantism (Uslaner, 2002; Guiso et al., 2003; Delhey 
and Newton, 2005), although one study finds no statistically significant effect (Bjørnskov, 
2007). However, the latter study does identify a positive effect of Hinduism and Buddhism 
in  some  specifications.  Lastly,  looking  at  beliefs,  McCleary  and  Barro  (2006)  find  no 
statistically significant effect of belief in heaven, hell or an afterlife on trust. 
A second group of studies are based on individual-level data. Among them, Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002) find no statistically significant effect of religious affiliation on trust; 
likewise, Welch et al. (2007) find no clear evidence of an association between religiosity, as 
measured by frequency of prayer, activity in religious congregations and beliefs in absolute 
morality and the ”sinfulness of human nature”, and trust. Welch et al. (2004) report that 
affiliation with Christian churches is related to lower trust, except for those who participate 
a lot and who report that religion is important, where a positive effect is found. Brañas-
Garza et al. (2009) report that Catholic affiliation and observance is positively associated 
with  trust  among  Latin  Americans.  In  line  with  some  cross-country  studies,  results  in 
Traunmüller  (2009)  suggest  that  church  attendance  among  German  Protestants  is 
associated with higher levels of trust.  
A third group of studies are also based on individual-level data but are experimental. 
Anderson et al. (2006) test whether religious affiliation and participation are associated 
with behavior in public goods and trust games and find that the former is unrelated to 
individual  behavior  and  that  the  latter  has  some  mild  effects.  In  public  goods  games, 
voluntary contributions increased with religious participation, and in certain trust games, 
individuals  with  the  highest  participation  rates  were  both  less  trusting  and  more 
trustworthy.  Tan  (2006)  finds  no  effect  of  religion  on  other-regarding  behavior  in 
                                                 
3 Formally, Catholic or Orthodox Christianity are not religions but branches of the Christian religion, but for reasons of 
brevity, we sometimes refer to them as religions. Furthermore, the term “hierarchical” is standard usage, following Putnam 
(1993). 6 
 
ultimatum and dictator games conducted in Germany. Tan and Vogel (2008) report that 
religious trustees are trusted more, especially by religious trusters. Johansson-Stenman et 
al. (2009) find, for rural Bangladesh, that Muslims and Hindus trust people of their own 
religion more than they trust others and that Muslims are relatively more distrustful of 
Hindus.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Arguments 
 
Turning to the theoretical reasons to expect an association between religiosity and trust, 
Orbel et al. (1992) report that many seem to think that religion exerts a positive influence 
on  trust:  in  particular,  religious  persons  were  thought  to  be  more  cooperative  in  a 
prisoners’ dilemma experiment. And indeed, there are arguments for a positive effect on 
trust, mainly based on the idea that religions generally encourage adherents to do well 
unto others. But there are also arguments for a negative effect, mainly based on the idea 
that  religiosity  may  create  divides  between  the  religious  and  the  non-religious.  In  the 
following, we take a closer, albeit brief, look at the arguments regarding a positive effect, a 
negative effect, no effect and causality. 
 
A Positive Effect 
 
Regarding  a  positive  relationship,  religion  seems  able  to  influence  behavior  in  various 
ways.  For  instance,  Iannaccone  (1998)  surveys  studies  that  document  a  relationship 
between religion and criminal activity, drug and alcohol consumption, physical and mental 
health,  and  incidence  and  stability  of  marriage  patterns;  Berggren  (1997)  finds  that 
religious involvement is negatively related to abortion rates, the rate of children born out 
of wedlock, divorce rates and rates of not paying bills on time; and Putnam (2000) finds 
signs  of  religiously  active  individuals  being  more  involved  in  donations  to  charity  and 
volunteering. Effects of these kinds could arise partly because of the religious teachings 
and partly because of the social interaction that religiosity often entails.4  
                                                 
4 Iannaccone (1998: 1476) argues for a causal effect: “The argument for genuine impact begins with the fact 
that most religious institutions are forthright and specific about their moral – behavioral injunctions and do 
employ  many  time-tested  methods  of  indoctrination  and  social  control:  early  education,  parental 7 
 
As for teachings, many religions urge their followers to follow an ethics of reciprocity 
and generosity toward others. In Christianity, this is embedded in the Golden Rule in Luke 
6:31:  “Do  unto  others  as  you  would  have  them  do  unto  you”.  Likewise,  in  Islam, 
Mohammed’s farewell sermon includes the assertion ”Hurt no one so that no one may hurt 
you”. In Judaism, Leviticus 19:34 commands that ”The stranger who resides with you shall 
be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in 
the land of Egypt”.5 Religion may, in this way, make use of or stimulate social or altruistic 
preferences (see e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; and Levitt and List, 2007).  
Furthermore, religions often prohibit socially destructive behavior. To the extent that 
people believe that religious persons adhere to these teachings, such persons are probably 
perceived as more trustworthy, which may in turn induce trust. If, say, one believes that a 
religious person does not cheat or steal, because this is prohibited by her religion, then one 
may feel that this person can be trusted.  
It is not only the case that religions urge their followers to follow these teachings – 
the teachings may be internalized, not least due to conscious efforts to influence children, 
but are in any case generally enforced, which should make religious people seem even 
more trustworthy. Enforcement can be undertaken by other devotees or, at least in the 
minds  of  the  religious,  by  some  deity  or  cosmic  system  of  justice.  For  example,  many 
religious  groups  uphold  strict  behavioral  codes  and  discipline  and  ostracize  those  who 
break them – for the logic of such rules, see Iannaccone (1992) – and people who behave 
badly may end up in hell or be reborn as some being with lower consciousness.  
As for social interaction, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) argue that collective rituals, that are 
often important parts of religious life, serve a useful purpose in stimulating social cohesion 
and  a  more  favorable  attitude  toward  cooperation.  This  could  also  extend  to  the  non-
religious. Furthermore, Demerath (2003: 348) states that “at the micro level, religion can 
foster  a  sense  of  ‘social  capital’  by  giving  its  lay  participants  practice  in,  and 
encouragement for, participating in wider social and political, whether as mere voters or as 
intense activists”. Yet, it bears mention that this broad type of effect rests on the assertion 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reinforcement,  conditional  status  and  membership,  appeals  to  tradition  and  an  all-seeing  judge,  and 
collective activities that foster social ties, facilitate monitoring, and raise the cost of disobedience”. 
5  Similar  commands  or  rules  can  be  found  in  virtually  all  the  major  world  religions  and  philosophies, 
including Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and Sikhism; see Wattles (1996). 8 
 
that  social  participation  generates  trust,  a  mechanism  that  is  still  debated  in  the  trust 
literature (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Claibourn and Mitchell, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). 
In total, decency and honesty towards other people is taught by almost all religions, 
which may make the religious more trusting. Also, there are enforcement mechanisms and 
social  stimulants  that  could  render  it  credible  that  the  religiously  devout  are  more 
trustworthy, which could induce trust from the non-religious, in all, implying a positive 
religiosity-trust relationship.  
 
A Negative Effect 
 
There are clearly some reasons to expect a positive effect of religiosity on trust. However, 
there are also some reasons to expect a negative effect. Broadly speaking, such an effect 
could come about in two different ways: by how religiosity affects the religious and by how 
religiosity affects the non-religious. We take these in turn. 
The idea here is that people for whom religion is important may trust others less, and 
as their share of the population increases, social trust decreases.6 In this sense, religion 
creates a divide in society, where those who believe may consider others as wicked or at 
least ignorant of and less prone to adhere to important moral insights.7 After all, the non-
believers  are  not  subjected  to  the  same  moral  teachings,  to  the  same  internalization 
mechanisms, to the same enforcement mechanisms (be it social or divine) or to the same 
social  interaction.8  To  the  extent  that  the  religious  trust  others,  then,  this  is  mostly 
restricted  to  their  own  group,  as  noted  by  Uslaner  (2002).  Smith  et  al.  (1998:  ch.  4) 
develop a religious-identity theory and argue that because of pluralist societies, religion 
makes fruitful use of distinction, engagement, conflict, and threat in relation to others. By 
defining themselves in relation to what they are not, pluralism enables the religious to 
                                                 
6 At the aggregate level, this mechanism could in principle continue until the share of non-believers is very 
small, at which point religiosity stops mattering for trust. 
7  Some  religious  people  may  hold  that  without  religion,  there  is  no  firm,  credible  basis  for  moral  rules, 
indeed,  that  morality  may  not  even  exist,  which  implies  that  the  non-religious,  although  not  necessarily 
immoral, are more prone to not follow the true moral teachings than those who believe in a divine law-
maker. See Garcia and King (2008). 
8 In the  most serious cases, religion is a  basis for terrorism and warfare against perceived enemies. On 
religion and domestic conflict, see e.g. Fox (2004). 9 
 
develop a stronger sense of group boundaries. Through “sacred umbrellas” the religious 
can form strong bonds between themselves, while interacting with others, who are not part 
of  these  bonds.  One  can  well  envisage  that  social  trust  does  not  flourish  under  these 
umbrellas.9 Indeed, Guiso et al. (2003: 249) find that religious people are more intolerant 
of people of different background than themselves, compared to the non-religious, and 
that they hold a less equal view of women (cf. Emerson and Smith, 2000; Greer et al., 
2005). 
The character in which a religion is organized and exercised could also play a role in 
reducing the trust levels of the religious. To the extent that religiosity takes place within a 
hierarchical  religion,  such  as  Islam,  Catholicism  or  Orthodox  Christianity,  this  may 
discourage trust, as “[v]ertical bonds of authority are more characteristic of the Italian 
Church than horizontal bonds of fellowship” (Putnam, 1993: 107; cf. La Porta et al., 1997: 
336)  and  as  “trends  in  religious  life  reinforce  rather  than  counterbalance  the  ominous 
plunge in social connectedness in the secular community” (Putnam, 1993: 79). Iannaccone 
(1998:  1483)  notes  that  more  fundamentalist  churches  often  apply  stricter  behavioral 
codes and feel a need to monitor members, which may signal an underlying distrust within 
the family of believers. Everybody is seen as prone to “fall into sin”. And if enforcement 
within the group is carried out by some third-party entity, such as a group of leaders in a 
hierarchy or (as thought by the devout) a god, then people do not “need” to trust each 
other, further reinforcing a tendency for distrust. In line with this, Daniels and von der 
Ruhr (2008) find that fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics trust others less than do 
individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular denomination; see also Coreno 
(2002). As Seul (1999: 553) states: 
 
Religions frequently supply cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other 
identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form of 
a  predictable  world,  a  sense  of  belonging, self-esteem,  and  even  self-actualization.  The  peculiar 
ability of  religion  to  serve  the  human  identity  impulse  thus  may  partially explain  why  intergroup 
conflict so frequently occurs along religious fault lines. 
 
                                                 
9 On religious identity theory, see also Ammerman (2003). On identity theory more generally, see Burke and 
Stets (2009). 10 
 
As mentioned above, religiosity could influence trust negatively in a second major 
way, through its effects on the non-religious, who may react to increased religiosity in a 
way  that  reduces  social  trust.  The  non-religious  may  consider  the  religious  strange  or 
different, and they may think that they behave well only so long as they expect to get social 
or divine rewards for doing so, i.e. that honest behavior is not rooted in moral so much as 
in purely self-interested motives.10 This is in line with the theoretical discussion in Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002), in which people trust those who are “similar” to them (and to the 
non-religious, the religious may seem dissimilar) and where trust is lower in communities 




It remains an option that religiosity could also be unrelated to trust if either the teachings 
of religions constitute mere talk and if the religious do not pay much attention to them in 
practice,  or  if  the  opposite  effects  outlined  above  somehow  cancel  each  other  out.  In 
addition, empirical results that show an effect could merely display a spurious correlation 
due  to  omitted  variables  or  selection  bias.  For  example,  there  may  be  an  underlying 
characteristic that cause some individuals to have both a certain degree of religiosity and a 
certain degree of trust. In studies where a positive coefficient is obtained, this may instead 
reflect  that  certain  people  have  social  preferences  that  induce  them  to  both  become 




Finally, we need to ask whether there could also be a reverse causal relationship, i.e. one of 
trust  increasing  or  reducing  religiosity.  As  for  trust  increasing  religiosity,  one  could 
imagine the possibility of trusting people being more open to the messages of others. Since 
                                                 
10 One attractive feature of this second way of explaining a negative effect of religiosity on trust is that this 
can  reconcile  the  results  of  studies  who  find  a  positive  association  between  religion  and  trust  on  the 
individual level with the results who find a negative association between religion and trust on the aggregate 
level. 
11 For more on this, see e.g. La Porta et al. (1997: 337), Iannaccone (1998: 1476–1476) and Guiso et al. (2003: 
249).  11 
 
some religions try to recruit new followers, they could be more successful in a setting of 
high trust. As for an effect in the opposite direction, we note that higher trust in ones 
fellow human beings could arguably reduce the felt need for religion. To some extent, trust 
in a non-religious setting could therefore substitute for some of the perceived benefits of 
joining a community of strict teachings that are enforced. Conversely, if individuals feel 
that other people cannot be trusted, religious beliefs may offer a necessary refuge from an 
apparently immoral and dangerous material world and the comfort that the virtuous are 




This theoretical discussion indicates that religiosity could stimulate, reduce or be unrelated 
to trust – and that reverse causality could obtain. The main reason to expect a positive 
effect of religiosity is that religions often teach honesty and generosity toward others and 
that  they  provide  social  arenas  that  foster  cooperation.  The  main  reason  to  expect  a 
negative effect is that religions may cause division and rift, both in that the religious may 
distrust the non-religious and people of other religions and in that the non-religious may 
distrust  the  religious.  As  such,  one  can  argue  for  whatever  net  effect  based  on  solid 




3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
In order to estimate the association between religiosity and trust, we largely follow the 
methodology of the existing cross-country literature on the determinants of trust.  
First, we use the standard trust measure, which is the share of the population of a 
country or state which answers “yes” to the question ”In general, do you think most people 
can be trusted or can’t you be too careful?”. While the question may seem vague, a number 
of studies show that respondents perceive this question as a measure of trust in strangers 
or people in general and that it correlates well with other measures of non-enforceable but 
honest  behavior  (Knack  and  Keefer,  1997;  Uslaner,  2002;  Bjørnskov,  2007,  2008b). 
Nannestad  (2008)  also  notes  that  surprisingly  few  respondents  –  typically  below  five 12 
 
percent – in surveys refrain from answering the question; hence, even though the question 
may  a  priori  seem  vague,  most  people  seem  able  to  provide  an  unequivocal  answer. 
Furthermore, both in-depth interviews in Uslaner (2002), and the fact that the simple 
trust question predicts outcomes of trust experiments reasonably well when the stakes of 
properly  anonymized  games  are  of  economic  significance,  suggest  that  the  question 
measures trust in strangers, i.e., trust without specific information (Sapienza et al., 2007; 
Ostrom et al., 2009). This is also most clearly indicated by recent research showing that 
social  trust  picked  up  by  the  standard  question  and  questions  specifically  directed  at 
measuring trust in family and close friends are constructs that are negatively associated 
(Alesina and Guiliano, 2009). 
For the cross-country comparisons, we use the average of all available and credible 
observations in the five waves of the World Values Survey, supplemented by data from the 
LatinoBarómetro, the AfroBarometer, the Asian and East Asia Barometers, and the Danish 
Social  Capital  Project;  all  of  these  surveys  have  asked  the  same  trust  question  in 
approximately representative samples.12 In our cross-state US comparison, we instead use 
the trust data in Brown and Uslaner (2005), which primarily rest on the 1990s waves of the 
General Social Survey, supplemented by data from the American National Election Studies 
and  surveys  by  the  Pew  Research  Center;  the  combination  of  these  surveys  brings  the 
number of respondents in 43 states up to workable numbers.13 
To get an impression of the differences, the international trust scores range from a 
low of 3.4 in Cape Verde, with almost similar scores in Trinidad and Tobago and Rwanda, 
to a well-known high above 60 percent in the Nordic monarchies (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden).  The  range  across  the  43  US  states  covered  in  the  sample  is  a  low  of  10.5 
(Arkansas) to a high of 63 percent (New Hampshire). As such, although the American 
                                                 
12  Following the literature, we do not consider the Iranian and Chinese World Values Survey data as credible, 
as the trust observations are outliers in most analyses (cf. Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007). We also exclude 
the Canadian 2000 observation as other surveys conducted in the same year showed unalterred trust levels 
since 1995, questioning the validity of the much smaller World Values Survey number. 
13 A “workable” number usually means about 200-500 respondents in each unit, although working with high-
quality  surveys  may  allow  one  to  use  somewhat  smaller  sample  sizes  and  still  get  reasonably  accurate 
estimates.  This  means  that  we  automatically  exclude  Hawaii,  Idaho,  Maine,  Nebraska,  Nevada  and  New 
Mexico, as well as the District of Columbia, which appears as a separate state-like entity in most US surveys. 13 
 
average is much higher, the cross-state data are not substantially less variable than the 
cross-country data. 
Second, our data on religiosity derive from Gallup (2007), who asked respondents ”Is 
religion an important part of your daily life?”. Our measure is the share of the population 
that answered “yes” to this question. While religiosity can be measured in multiple ways, 
we consider this question to capture the saliency of religion in everyday life, as argued in 
the preceding section. That is, instead of measuring the concept as is usually done, by 
either formal membership or attendance at worship, this measure is arguably less sensitive 
to the type of religion, and in particular religious experience not associated with organized 
religion. We do not consider differences across religious affiliations (except as a sensitivity 
analysis), ways or modes of worship or other aspects of religion, but focus on how religious 
people  are.  Finally,  while  we  only  use  one  variable  to  measure  religiosity,  it  is  worth 
emphasizing  that  it  not  only  has  the  benefit  of  being  available  at  two  analytical  levels 
(cross-country and cross-state), the validity of the question as a measure of religiosity and 
strength of beliefs has been previously corroborated (Halman and Draulans, 2006). 
Like the trust data, the religiosity variable also exhibits very large differences, both 
across the world and across the US. The least religious countries in the world, according to 
this question, are Estonia, Sweden and Denmark with scores below 20 percent, while the 
most religious are Bangladesh, Indonesia and Egypt, the latter with a score of 100 percent. 
The mean in the present sample is 67 percent while, in comparison, the US mean is 64 
percent. The least religious US state is Vermont, which at 42 percent is roughly on par with 
Spain and Switzerland that form an OECD average. The most religious state, Mississippi, 
in which 85 percent of the population answered yes, is placed along countries such as 
India, El Salvador and Malaysia. As such, the Gallup survey confirms that religion is, on 
average, substantially more important in the US than in most countries belonging to the 
Western  hemisphere  (cf.  Inglehart  and  Baker,  2000;  McCleary  and  Barro,  2006;  Pew, 
2007).14  
We follow the recent literature in our choice of control variables; all variables for both 
analyses are described, with descriptive statistics in Tables A1 and A2 and sources and 
                                                 
14 Using the simple first-stage estimates in the following to predict religiosity suggest that, had US religiosity 
followed the pattern common to the rest of the world, US GDP per capita ought to have been only a third of 
what it actually is. Claims that the US resembles a developing country when it comes to such attitudinal 
factors are therefore not entirely unwarranted. 14 
 
definitions  in  Table  A3  of  the  Appendix.15  In  the  cross-country  analysis  these  variable 
include  income  inequality,  controls  for  monarchies  and  postcommunist  countries,  a 
dummy for the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and 
the  shares  of  the  population  belonging  to  either  Catholicism,  Islam,  or  an  “Eastern” 
religion (Buddhism and Hinduism). 16 We add these affiliation data in order to ensure that 
our results in the following are due to differences in religiosity, and not to differences in 
religious composition. 
In  the  cross-state  analysis,  we  follow  the  previous  literature  by  including  income 
inequality, the share of African-Americans in the state population, and controls for a set of 
different  birth  cohorts  to  take  care  of  baby-boomer  and  WWII  generational  effects.  In 
addition,  we  include  a  synthetic  measure  intended  to  capture  the  well-documented 
generational persistence of trust (cf. Uslaner, 2008). This measure, which we take from 
Bjørnskov (2009b), is based on the implicit assumption that culturally transmitted trust 
may not have changed markedly since the major immigration waves in the 19th century. 
We  take  advantage  of  a  question  in  the  US  Census  asking  about  respondents’  family 
origins, i.e. which country the main part of their ancestors came from. The synthetic trust 
measure  at  the  state  level  therefore  is  the  weighted  average  of  current  trust  in  100 
countries identified in the US Census (2008) as potential family origins; the weights are 
the shares of the state population identifying each of the countries as their family origin.17  
Most results in the following are obtained by a two-stage least squares estimator in 
order to allow for the possibility that trust could affect religiosity, as outlined in section 2. 
We identify the causal effect by the use of instrumental variables that capture established 
                                                 
15 The relevant literature on cross-country determinants of social trust includes Uslaner (2002), Delhey and 
Newton (2005), Berggren and Jordahl (2006) and Bjørnskov (2007); the corresponding literature on cross-
state determinants includes Robinson and Jackson (2001), Uslaner (2002), Brown and Uslaner (2005) and 
Bjørnskov (2009b). We in no way claim that this list is exhaustive, only that these studies use the largest and 
most comparable samples and address one or more of the problems outlined in Nannestad’s (2008) critical 
survey. 
16 Recent studies providing the basis on which to choose our control variables include Delhey and Newton 
(2005), Berggren and Jordahl (2006), Bjørnskov (2007) and Jordahl (2009). 
17 Given the unlikely assumptions that people perfectly identified the origins of their family and that trust was 
entirely  stable  over  time  such  that  no  other  influences  could  be  detected,  this  synthetic  measure  would 
perfectly predict state average trust levels. However, we note that this requires that trust is approximately 
stable across an entire century. 15 
 
correlates of religiosity. In the cross-country analysis, our instrumental variables are the 
logarithm to GDP per capita (measured in purchasing-power adjusted USD; baseline year 
is 2000) and a dummy for countries situated in North Africa or the Middle East, as this 
region is more religious than would be predicted by its GDP. The reason seems to be that 
oil and other resources constitute the main part of their production, which therefore does 
not reflect broader modernization trends. In the cross-state regressions, our instruments 
are  the  logarithm  to  gross  state  product  per  capita  (measured  in  purchasing-power 
adjusted 2000 USD) and the state average voter turnout in presidential elections in the 
1990s, which is known to correlate well with religiosity (Gerber et al., 2008). While it could 
be argued that these instruments should correlate with the error terms of the regressions 
in the following, thus making them invalid, we throughout provide Hansen’s J statistic to 
indicate that this is not the case. 
In  a  set  of  additional  robustness  analyses,  we  split  the  cross-country  sample  in 
different ways. First, in Table 2, we present results that exclude observations with large 
residuals, observations in the top and bottom deciles of the trust distribution and, in an 
OLS regression, countries identified as outliers by Cook’s D. Second, in Table 3, we present 
results for our religiosity variable when excluding deciles covering countries with low trust, 
high trust, low religiosity, high religiosity, Muslim, Catholic, Eastern religion, Orthodox, 
high incomes, low incomes and an unfree press. These tests, which we outline in more 
detail below, are made to ensure that results are not driven by countries with extreme data 





Before dealing with robustness and the central causality issue, we start by exploring the 
bivariate correlations across the world and the US states. That there is some association 
between religiosity and social trust is visible to the naked eye in both the cross-country 
sample in Figure 1 and the cross-state sample in Figure 2. The simple correlations are -.52 
in the former and -.57 in the latter. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 16 
 
 
Judging  simply  from  a  bivariate  relation  yields  a  surprisingly  precise  estimate  of 
trust. In the cross-country sample, only 11 countries are more than 1.5 standard deviations 
off a simple regression line: Mongolia and Trinidad and Tobago in a negative direction, 
while Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, Indonesia, Saudi 
Arabia  and  Thailand  are  substantially  more  trusting  than  the  simple  line  suggests. 
Likewise, only six US states are more than 1.5 standard deviations off the line: Alaska, 
Arkansas and Delaware in a negative direction, and Utah and both Dakotas in a positive 
direction.  Given  the  strongly  indicative  associations  in  these  figures,  we  proceed  to 
regression results. 
 
4.1. Cross-Country Results 
 
We start with the cross-country results, which we report in Table 2. We first note that the 
effect of religiosity is negative and significant throughout. The bivariate estimate in column 
1  is  reduced  somewhat  when  including  a  set  of  standard  controls,  but  remains  of 
approximately the same magnitude. We also note that the control variables exhibit the 
same results as in previous studies: income inequality is strongly significant and negative, 
Nordic countries are substantially more trusting than other countries, as are monarchies, 
while  the  populations  in  countries  with  a  communist  past  are  less  trusting.  Only  the 
monarchy  result  fails  once  when  we  exclude  the  ten  percent  most  trusting  countries, 
among which monarchies are strongly overrepresented. In these respects, our large sample 
does not exhibit much different characteristics than the smaller country samples used in 
previous cross-country studies. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The identifying assumption of our IV estimates is that economic development does 
not affect the variation of trust not captured by standard controls through other channels 
than religiosity. This may a priori seem like a quite restrictive assumption, yet we note that 
previous  research  tends  to  agree  on  this  point,  and  that  its  exclusion  is  practically 
unproblematic  for  our  present  purpose  if  measures  of  formal  institutions  (known  to 
correlate with both GDP and trust) are only weakly correlated with religiosity (Murray, 17 
 
2006).  We  also  note  that  all  Hansen  J  statistics  are  insignificant;  although  the  test 
associated with the simple bivariate association in column 1 is doubtful, this is due to 
variation picked up by control variables in the following columns. As such, we are far from 
rejecting the assumptions necessary for identifying causality. 
Noting  this,  the  results  in  Table  2  indicate  that  religiosity  discourages  trust,  as 
measured at the national level. All other things being equal, the results suggest that moving 
from average religiosity (67 percent) to a Nordic level (20 percent) would be associated 
with, on average, an increase in trust of roughly 8-10 percentage points. Moreover, the 
inclusion of religiosity entirely swallows any clear effects of religious denominations found 
in previous studies (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007); the religion indicators 
fail being jointly significant by a large margin and thus provide no additional information 
(F = .89). Interestingly, the clear negative effect of having large shares of the population 
adhere to Islam in particular seems to be an effect of Muslim populations being much 
more religious than most other religions. As such, Arab Muslims in particular come to 
reflect the hope often attributed to Muhammad: “An Arab is superior to a non-Arab in 
nothing but devotion” (quoted in Karsh, 2007: 19).18 
The main result proves to be robust to excluding outliers identified by two different 
methods in columns 3 and 6 – in the former by calculating residuals from 2SLS results, in 
the latter by Cook’s Distance in OLS results – and to excluding the top and bottom ten 
percent  of  the  sample,  and  as  such  estimating  the  effects  in  a  range  relevant  to  most 
countries. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
In Table 3, we experiment with another set of robustness tests. Here, we exclude 
countries based on their trust levels (the decile with the highest trust levels or the decile 
with the lowest trust levels), level of religiosity (the decile with the highest religiosity or the 
decile  with  the  lowest  religiosity),  level  of  economic  development  (richest  half  of  the 
                                                 
18  We  note  that  these  effects  are  not  contingent  on  which  religion  people  believe  in.  By  calculating  the 
leverage of each observation (DFBetas) on the point estimate of religiosity, it is possible to get a sense of 
whether countries with population majorities belonging to specific religions have more leverage. Doing so, 
we find no evidence to indicate that any one confessional religion has more leverage. We nevertheless note 
that Buddhism, a religious philosophy more than a religion, has relatively less leverage. 18 
 
sample or poorest half of the sample), or predominant religion (Muslim, Catholic, Eastern 
religions,  Orthodox  Christians,  and  Orthodox  Christians  including  postcommunist 
countries). In the case of the religious variables, we exclude the ten percent with the largest 
population adhering to a specific religion, thereby testing whether our results are driven by 
that  particular  religion.  In  the  case  of  Orthodox  Christianity,  we  have  two  groups  of 
countries: one where we only consider the Orthodox populations and one where we add 
the postcommunist Central and Eastern European countries. In the former case, a decile is 
excluded;  in  the  second  case,  the  same  countries  are  excluded,  as  well  as  the 
postcommunist ones, and they together consequently make up more than a decile. The 
reason  for  this  last  exercise  is  that  since  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
experienced  half  a  century  of  strong  political  influence  from  Russia,  one  of  the  most 
Orthodox  Christian  nations,  they  may  arguably  also  have  taken  on  certain  social 
characteristics associated with Orthodox Christianity. Finally, we also test whether results 
are driven by countries with limited political and informational freedom, as measured by 
the number of violations of press freedom.19 This last test is to ensure that our findings are 
not simply due to a potentially spurious correlation between religiosity and the protection 
of free speech and information. 
While  the  size  of  our  estimate  of  religiosity  varies  some,  we  note  that  it  remains 
significant  throughout.  In  an  additional  set  of  robustness  tests  (not  shown),  we  also 
ascertain that our results are robust to including measures of ethnic or religious diversity, 
alternative  codings  of  the  religious  composition  of  the  population,  and  measures  of 
institutional quality capturing legal quality or the extent of democracy, thus conforming 
with  the  trust  literature  (Bjørnskov,  2007;  Nannestad,  2008).  Given  that  Hansen’s  J 
statistic  is  never  significant  and  very  far  from  significance  when  excluding  the  most 
obvious outliers, we believe that the significant results can moreover be interpreted as a 
causal effect of religiosity on trust. 
 
4.2. Cross-state results 
                                                 
19  We  use  the  Reporters  Without  Borders  (RSF)  measure  of  press  freedom  instead  of  more  standard 
measures of freedom such as indicators of democracy and the rule of law, as it is less correlated with GDP. 
We thereby partly sidestep the problem of splitting samples based on highly correlated indices purportedly 
measuring something different. In addition, the press freedom index is arguably a better measure of free 
speech than most other institutional measures. 19 
 
 
However, one could still fear that international differences of religiosity simply capture 
other cultural features that are only spuriously correlated with the importance of religion 
in daily life. Another potential problem could arise if religiosity is primarily associated with 
trust  in  relatively  poor  countries,  or  if  the  negative  effects  do  not  pertain  to  Christian 
denominations. In order to make sure that these worries are unfounded, we therefore also 
estimate the importance in a cross-section of 43 US states for which credible trust scores 
exist. This additional approach has a number of advantages. 
First, the US is, as always, a good laboratory for retesting cross-country findings, as 
the  set-up  of  formal  institutions  and  the  overall  political  and  popular  culture  is 
approximately the same across the country or, as a minimum, substantially less diverse 
than  in  cross-country  samples.  This  alleviates  the  potential  problems  of  omitted 
institutional and structural variables endemic to the cross-country literature. Likewise, the 
US is to a very large extent dominated by Christianity, which allows us to sidestep the issue 
of  basic  religious  conflicts  in  society.  It  also  provides  a  possibility  to  test  whether  the 
negative cross-country findings pertain to Christian religious affiliations, and not simply to 
other religions. 
Second, in the US sample, we have the opportunity to control for cultural differences 
determined by deep historical roots through creating a synthetic “ancestral trust measure”, 
following Bjørnskov (2009b). As outlined above, this measure is created as a weighted 
average of present-day trust levels in 100 countries from which Americans state that their 
ancestors came and is therefore likely to pick up effects deeply rooted in stable cultures. 
We note here that if religiosity also includes a component that is approximately stable 
across generations, the inclusion of ancestral trust is likely to lead us to underestimate the 
effects of religiosity on trust across the US states, as part of the effect of religiosity in a 
historical perspective would be included in the synthetic measure of ancestral trust. The 
estimates in the following can therefore be seen as a lower bound of a “true” long-run 
effect. 
Our identifying assumptions behind the instrumental variables are similar to those in 
the cross-country analysis. In the cross-state analysis, we assume that GDP per capita and 
voter turnout in presidential elections do not affect trust through other channels than their 
association with religiosity. While both could in theoretically plausible ways be connected 
to trust, we note that Hansen’s J statistic is quite far from significance when including all 20 
 
control  variables.  The  estimates  are  therefore  not  likely  to  overestimate  the  effects  of 
religiosity. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 reveals that the negative effect of religiosity on trust in the cross-country 
analysis remains negative when measured at the level of US states, and quite robustly so. 
The IV estimates of columns 1-3 all display a negative association, as do the OLS estimates 
in columns 5-6, while the estimate in column 4, where the top and bottom deciles of the 
trust  distribution  are  excluded,  retains  the  negative  sign  but  does  not  attain  statistical 
significance. However, the size of the estimated coefficient of religiosity is smaller for the 
US than for the international sample. If one goes from the average level of religiosity (65 
percent) to the lowest level (42 percent in Vermont), this entails an increased trust level of 
about  five  to ten  percentage  points;  put  differently,  a  one  standard  deviation  shock  to 
religiosity  seems  to  produce  a  change  in  trust  levels  of  about  one  third  of  a  standard 
deviation.  
A notable feature of our analysis is that income inequality, which otherwise is one of 
the  most  robust  determinants  of  trust  to  be  found  in  the  literature,  is  insignificant 
throughout in our cross-state analysis. One explanation might be that religiosity could be 
antecedent to inequality. The share of blacks is negatively related to trust throughout,20 
while the cohort effects are generally significant, as is our synthetic ancestral trust variable: 
a higher degree of such trust increases trust by about the same amount, pointing at the 
possible importance of a cultural transmission of trust.  
We therefore note that the cross-state analysis broadly reproduces the findings from 
the cross-country analysis above. While the effects in the US are smaller, consistent with 
the  somewhat  smaller  variation  in  religiosity  across  the  US,  we  consistently  find  that 
religiosity is negatively associated with trust. Furthermore, at both analytical levels, the 
size of the estimates is sufficient to warrant real attention. 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that while Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) find that the share of foreign-born persons in 
Swedish counties is related to lower trust, the vast majority of the present Black population is born in the US. 
While the strongly negative association between trust and the size of the Black population therefore cannot 
be due to nationality, it may still be caused by having an easily identifiable population that also identifies 






As trust has been shown to be important for the attainment of widely desired goals, such as 
economic  growth,  democratic  stability  and  subjective  well-being,  the  question  of  what 
stimulates  trust  constitutes  a  relevant  research  topic.  We  investigate  the  net  effect  of 
religiosity on trust, a topic that social scientists have recently begun to explore. Unlike the 
previous literature, we make use of a measure of religiosity that measures the share of a 
population for which (any) religion is important in their daily life, which we believe better 
captures  “true”  religiosity,  excluding  those  members  of  religions  and  participants  in 
religious  events  that  are  not  believers  and  including  those  who  are  not  members  of 
established religion but who are nevertheless believers. We furthermore conduct our study 
on  the  basis  of  broader  samples  than  before,  in  the  form  of  a  cross-country  analysis 
covering more than 100 countries and a US cross-state analysis, and we use instrumental 
variables to delve into the issue of causality. 
Our results indicate that religiosity exerts a negative influence on trust and that this 
result is robust to changing the sample in various ways. That is, if religiosity was lower, 
trust levels would be higher – especially, it turns out, at a cross-country level. There, going 
from an average degree or religiosity to the lowest degree is related to an increase in trust 
by eight to ten percentage points. At the US cross-state level, the marginal effect is, again, 
negative, but somewhat smaller. 
On  theoretical  grounds,  this  result  is  not  surprising,  although  there  are  also 
arguments for a possible positive relationship. We argue that the main reason to expect a 
positive effect of religiosity is that religions often teach honesty and generosity toward 
others and that they provide social arenas that foster cooperation. The main reason to 
expect a negative effect, of the kind we have identified, is that religions may cause division 
and rift, both in that religious people may distrust those who do not share their beliefs and 
who are not subject to the same enforcement mechanisms as they are, and in that non-
religious people may regard with suspicion those who take religiosity seriously. 
A further question is if our results tell us something about whether some religions are 
more adverse to trust than others. While we in no way consider this an answer, the outliers 
which we identify by Cook’s D provide a suggestion. These outliers are Indonesia, Japan, 22 
 
Mongolia and Thailand, two with substantially higher trust levels than would be predicted 
by our specification in Table 2 along with very high levels of religiosity (Indonesia and 
Thailand, +22 percent) and two with somewhat lower trust levels and relatively low levels 
of religiosity (Japan and Mongolia, -9 and -14 percent, respectively). These countries are 
also unified in having strongly Buddhist traditions, a religion without apparent secular 
meaning and a specific focus on peace and tolerance. Yet, whether Buddhism is different 
from  other  religions  in  this  particular  aspect  is  a  question  that  we  cannot  provide  an 
answer  to  here.  Likewise,  we  cannot  control  for  whether  people  adhere  to  particularly 
radical versions of some religion. These matters are topics for future research. 
To summarize, while we cannot say with absolute certainty that religiosity always and 
everywhere causes reductions in trust, while we are not able to discern, with our data, how 
the effect of religiosity comes about and while our findings do not imply that religiosity or 
religiously  based  traditions  cannot  have  other,  favorable  behavioral  effects  on  e.g. 
corruption or politics (cf. Paldam, 2001), it is quite clear that religiosity is not necessary for 
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Table 1. Cross-tabulations, church attendance and religiosity 
  Attend  Don't  Trust (row) 
Believe  44.15  36.48  36.47 
Don't  3.56  13.81  43.62 
Trust (column)  38.64  36.95   
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Table 2. Cross-country determinants 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  2SLS  OLS 
      excl. obs. 
with 
residuals > 





  excl. obs. 
with large 
Cook’s D 
















































































Observations  104  101  90  81  102  98 
Pseudo R square  .26  .65  .78  .38  .65  .70 
F statistic  30.04  120.59  126.58  14.31  128.66  159.30 
RMSE  11.54  7.92  5.85  6.43  8.26  7.43 
First  stage  F 
statistic 
78.60  35.49  42.44  39.53     
First  stage  R 
square 
.46  .36  .49  .44     
Hansen J stat, p<  .16  .30  .55  .99     
Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Instrumental variables are the log to GDP 
per capita in 2000 and a dummy for North Africa and the Middle East. The outlier countries identified by 
Cook’s D (residuals larger than 4 / N) in column 6 are Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia and Thailand. 
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Table 3. Cross-country determinants, excluding groups of countries 
  1  2  3  4 
Excluding:  Low trust  High trust  Low religiosity  High religiosity 








Excluding:  Muslim  Catholic  Eastern  Orthodox plus 








Excluding:  Orthodox  Rich  Poor  Unfree 






  -27.43*** 
(7.52) 
Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Instrumental variables are the log to GDP 
per capita in 2000 and a  dummy for North Africa and the Middle East. All regressions include the full 
specification reported in Table 2. “Orthodox plus” refers to countries with large Orthodox populations plus 
other postcommunist countries. Unfree is defined as countries with the most violations of press freedom as 
reported in RSF (2008). Excluded countries are based on deciles, except in the case of rich and poor, which 




Table 4. Cross-state determinants 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  2SLS  OLS 
      excl. obs. 
with 
residuals > 
1.5 std dev. 
excl.obs. in 
trust top and 
bottom deciles  
  excl. obs. 
with large 
Cook’s D 




















































































Observations  43  43  39  35  43  41 
Pseudo R square  .32  .76  .83  .69  .76  .79 
F statistic  19.43  16.34  31.08  15.25  17.17  23.68 
RMSE  9.59  5.75  4.56  4.52  6.47  6.08 
First  stage  F 
statistic 
31.06  11.46  10.55  10.68     
First  stage  R 
square 
.60  .51  .50  .49     
Hansen J stat, p<  .01  .86  .23  .74     
Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Instrumental variables are the log to GDP 
per capita in 2000 and the average voter turnout in presidential elections in the 1990s. The outlier states 




Table A1. Descriptive statistics, cross-country sample 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Min  Max  Observations 
Trust  25.48  14.42  3.79  64.27  105 
Religiosity  .67  .25  .16  1.00  105 
Income inequality  41.39  11.29  21.50  70.70  104 
Nordic country  .04  .19  0  1  105 
Monarchy  .13  .34  0  1  105 
Postcommunist  .24  .43  0  1  105 
Catholics  28.25  36.25  0  97.00  105 
Muslims  13.00  25.55  0  100.00  105 
Log GDP per capita  .29  .45  6.59  10.44  105 
Protestant  15.35  25.15  0  95.00  105 
Orthodox  12.04  28.02  0  98.00  105 
RSF index  22.371  18.072  .25  79.25  103 
North Africa and Middle East  .06  .23  0  1  105 





Table A2. Descriptive statistics, cross-state sample 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Min  Max  Observations 
Trust  38.08  11.77  10.50  63.00  44 
Religiosity  64.77  10.14  42.00  85.00  44 
Income inequality  .40  .02  .34  .45  44 
Black population  8.85  6.66  0.00  26.68  43 
Log GSP per capita  9.77  .17  9.44  10.17  44 
Voter turnout  .54  .06  .42  .68  44 
Cohort <1916  4.08  1.26  2.062  7.75  43 
Cohort 1916-30  19.83  3.80  11.88  31.75  43 
Cohort 1931-45  21.78  2.37  13.23  26.29  43 
Cohort 1945-60  35.59  3.28  27.96  45.32  43 




Table A3. Data definitions and sources 
  Source  Definition 
  Cross-country sample   
Trust    In text 
Religiosity  Gallup World Poll  In text 
Income inequality  WIID (2009)  Gross income Gini 
coefficient 
Nordic country  Own  Dummy for Nordic country 
Monarchy  Own  Dummy for monarchy 
Postcommunist  Own  Dummy for communist past 
Catholics  CIA (2008) /USDS (2008)  Share of population 
belonging to Catholic 
denomination 
Muslims  CIA (2008) /USDS (2008)  Share of population 
belonging to Muslim 
denomination 
Log GDP per capita  Summers and Heston (2006)  Logarithm to GDP per 
capita (PPP) in 2000 
Protestant  CIA (2008) /USDS (2008)  Share of population 
belonging to Protestant or 
Anglican denomination 
Orthodox  CIA (2008) /USDS (2008)  Share of population 
belonging to Orthodox 
Christian denomination 
RSF index  RSF (2008)  Number of reported 
violations of press freedom 
in 2007 
North Africa and Middle East  Own  Dummy for countries 
situated in North Africa and 
the Middle East 
Eastern religion  CIA (2008) /USDS (2008)  Share of population 
belonging to Buddhist or 
Hindu denomination 
  US Sample   
Trust  Brown and Uslaner (2005)  In text 
Religiosity  Gallup World Poll  In text 
Income inequality  BEA (2008)  Household disposable 36 
 
income Gini coefficient 
Black population  US Census  Share of African-Americans 
in state population 
Log GSP per capita  BEA (2008)  Logarithm to state-level 
GDP per capita (PPP) 1999 
Voter turnout    Turnout in presidential 
elections, 1992-2000 
Cohort <1916  US Census  Share of population in 1990 
born before 1916 
Cohort 1916-30  US Census  Share of population in 1990 
born 1916-1930 
Cohort 1931-45  US Census  Share of population in 1990 
born 1931-1945 
Cohort 1945-60  US Census  Share of population in 1990 
born 1945-1960 








Figure 2: Trust and religiosity across US states 
 
 